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Abstract
We analyze the impact of electronic money competition on
policy outcomes. We consider di®erent assumptions regarding the
objectives of the central bank and its ability to commit to future
policies. Electronic money competition can discipline a revenue
maximizing government and result in lower equilibrium in°ation
rates, even when there is imperfect commitment. The e±cient
Friedman rule is only implemented if the government maximizes
welfare. However electronic money competition may result in the
Friedman rule being non credible. We also show how an indepen-
dent choice of the reserve requirements can be an e®ective policy
rule to enhance the disciplinary role of electronic money compe-
tition.
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Technological change in transactions, such as the development in elec-
tronic payments, is blurring the distinction between di®erent components
of M1 (and among components of broader monetary aggregates). Does
competition from interest-bearing inside moneys enhance price stability?
An answer at ¯rst glance would be yes. However, one of the reasons for
high equilibrium in°ation rates is lack of commitment. And it is not
clear that competition can solve the time consistency problem of mone-
tary policy. In this paper we require the policy choices to be sequentially
optimal and obtain a positive answer to the question in the title, while
¯nding that competition and reputation do not reinforce each other.
Payments systems have gone through a major transformation in the
last decade. In particular, electronic payments have risen in most devel-
o p e dc o u n t r i e sa n da r ee x p e c t e dt or i s ee v e nm o r ei nt h ef u t u r e . F o r
example, Humphrey et al. (1996) ¯nd that \in all (fourteen) developed
countries but the United States, electronic payments have been either
the sole or the primary reason for the 34 percent rise in total non-cash
payments between 1987 and 1993"( p. 935)1. Electronic money is de-
posits that are used for transactions through electronic payments. These
payments have a low cost. In fact the clearing is considerably less ex-
pensive than the clearing of checks (1/2 to 1/3 according to Humphrey
at al, 1996). They are highly substitutable for currency because the pay-
ment is ultimately a liability of the card issuing bank (checks, instead,
are a liability of the purchaser). The purchases using cash cards are
immediately deducted from a bank account that typically pays interest.
This distinguishes electronic money from currency. Currency by its very
nature cannot pay nominal interest. Instead, electronic money can pay
nominal interest on the average balance at a very low cost.
The answer to the question whether competition in providing elec-
1The US is the exception because a larger fraction of non-cash transactions are
paper transactions. As it will become clear, however, our deﬂnition of \electronic
money" is fairly broad and encompasses most non-credit, non-cash, forms of payment,
such as most bank cards, debit cards, smart cards, etc.
1tronic money and competition between electronic money and currency
drives down the price of money is also an empirical one, and it is tempt-
ing to relate the impressive reduction in in°ation rates in the developed
world to the generalization of electronic money as a means of payment.
In fact most developed countries have experienced a drastic reduction of
in°ation rates in the last quarter of this century, from the double digit
numbers of the mid-seventies to the very low {say, below 2.5%- numbers
at the end of the nineties. High in°ation episodes seem to be a problem
of the past, as if society had become immune to the disease. This success
in curbing in°ation has usually been attributed to the major discipline,
in terms of monetary policy, of more independent central banks and, in
the case of the European Union, the design and willingness to comply
with the Maastricht Treaty have received most of the credit. But maybe,
the right incentives for monetary discipline have been created by the
widespread development and use of cash substitutes.
The close substitutability of cash cards with currency makes this
world with electronic money resemble a free banking world, i.e., the his-
torical episodes of relatively unrestricted banking systems, as the \Free
Banking Era" in the United States (1837-63), Scotland (1716-1844), New
England (1820-1860), Canada (1817-1914) and other historical experiences2.
In most cases, these episodes preceded the introduction of legal restric-
tions preventing the competition of privately issued bank notes. More
recently, in many countries steps have been taken to liberalize ¯nancial
services. But, more than to a pursuit of laissez-faire, the rise in electronic
money is due to a technological change (not suppressed by regulations)
which makes it possible for households and ¯rms to consolidate their cash
and deposits portfolios.
The issue of currencies competing in rates of return has also been
addressed by an extensive literature3 that focused on the currency sub-
2See Schuler (1992) for an account of historical episodes of free banking. See also
Dowd (1992) and, in particular, the scholarly editorial work of White (1993) for a
broad perspective of the literature on free banking; to which one must necessarily
add the writings of Hayek (1974,1978).
3For a survey of the main results and the policy implications see Calvo and Vegh
(1996). For a competitive equilibrium model exhibiting currency substitution, see
2stitution experiences of high in°ation countries. In those models govern-
ment policies are exogenous.
In this paper we develop a theoretical framework to study the e®ects
of electronic money competition |or, more generally, competition from
interest-bearing inside monies. In particular, we study the relationship
between competition and policy outcomes under di®erent assumptions
regarding the objectives of the central bank, the ability of the monetary
authorities to commit to future policies, and the legal restrictions {in the
form of reserve requirements{ on ¯nancial intermediaries. The contribu-
tion of this paper is to show how these di®erences a®ect the way in which
electronic money competition disciplines monetary authorities.
In interpreting the high in°ation rates of the late seventies and early
eighties, the literature emphasized the time inconsistency problem associ-
ated with monetary policy. Models with reputation have been developed
to analyze this problem and some of the policy recommendations, like
central bank independence, can be understood along these lines. The
time-inconsistency problem in implementing monetary policies is well
understood.
What is less clear is whether competition can help to overcome
this problem, or whether it may even worsen it. In other words, the
role of competition cannot be analyzed independently from the commit-
ment problem. While we have begun to understand how policies can
be designed in environments without full commitment (see, for example,
Chang (1996), Chari & Kehoe (1990), Ireland (1994), Stokey, 1991), with
{in part{ the exception of Taub (1985) the \currency competition" argu-
ment has abstracted from the reputational problem4.T h i si st h ec e n t r a l
theme of this paper.
In our model, \reputation" and \competition" are two disciplinary
mechanisms that, as it turns out, do not always complement each other.
To better understand this interplay, we study two contrasting hypothesis
regarding the objectives of the central bank. First (in Sections 3, 4 and
Uribe (1997).
4A shortcoming that has not gone unnoticed (see, for example, Hellwig (1985)).
35) we assume a \revenue maximizing" central bank, second (in Section 6)
a \representative" central bank; that is, a central bank which shares the
same preferences as the representative household. The later hypothesis
dominates the current academic literature on monetary policy design and
is attractive to central bank economists. However, it is not clear which
hypothesis is a better description of reality, and, therefore, we analyze
both (leaving to the reader the exercise of taking convex combinations).
In Section 2 we present the model. In Section 3 we show how
\electronic money" helps to curb down in°ation when the government is
a revenue maximizer. In the world with electronic money, the presence of
money-issuing competitive banks drives the intermediation gains to the
marginal intermediation cost. In°ation under full commitment is driven
down as a result of competition between the issuer of currency and the
anonymous suppliers of inside money, together with the reduction of
¯nancial intermediation costs.
In Section 4 we study the non-commitment case. The rent-seeking
commitment policy is time inconsistent, but in considering default, the
central bank must take into account that agents may move to electronic
money (i.e., depriving the central bank of future seignorage rents). It
turns out that, as long as there is no de°ation under the full commitment
policy, such a policy can be sustained by reputation. An odd feature of
this result is that to sustain the full commitment policy, the ¯nancial
intermediation sector cannot be too e±cient. The interest rate spread
between bonds and money must guarantee non-negative future rents to
the central bank.
However, reserve requirements a®ect this spread. This, on the one
hand, means that if reserve requirements are determined outside the
central bank, they can be used as an e®ective policy instrument; but, on
the other hand, it also means that if they are determined by the same
central bank then the positive role of competition can be undermined.
We analyze this in Section 5.
In Section 6 we study the case of a \representative" government.
Not surprisingly, under perfect commitment, the Friedman rule is the pol-
i c yc h o s e nb yt h ec e n t r a lb a n k( w h oa c t sa saR a m s e yp l a n n e r ) ,t h e r e f o r e ,
4t h e r ei sn or o l ef o r\ e l e c t r o n i cm o n e y "c o m p e t i t i o n .
However, the Ramsey solution is time-inconsistent and, therefore,
with imperfect commitment, the government must balance the gains of
deviating from the prescribed Friedman rule, against the costs of a devi-
a t i o n .A f t e rad e v i a t i o n ,h o u s e h o l d sd on o tu s ec a s h .W h e nc a s hi st h e
only liquid asset, this autarchic outcome is most undesired by the \rep-
resentative" government. In contrast, the \punishment" is less severe
when households can still use electronic money. As a result, the presence
of electronic money competition makes the \reputation" disciplinary ef-
fect less e®ective. We show, however, that if agents cannot adjust their
portfolios instantaneously, a benevolent government might be deterred
from deviating and might implement the Friedman rule, in spite of the
lack of commitment and the presence of electronic money competition.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
2 Monetary competitive equilibria
In this section we characterize competitive equilibria in which trans-
actions are performed with currency and electronic money. Electronic
money is interest bearing deposits that are liquid because they can be
used for transactions, through the use of electronic debit cards. Thus it
is a close substitute for currency.
The economy is populated by a large number of identical in¯nitely
lived households, ¯nancial intermediaries and a government. The house-












t and ht represent, respectively, consumption of a cash good,
consumption of a credit good and leisure in period t. Assuming that
leisure enters linearly in the utility function is in no way essential, but
signi¯cantly simpli¯es the derivations. The utility function u shares the
usual assumptions of concavity and di®erentiability.
5The representative household chooses sequences of consumption of
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0E0 are given and a no-Ponzi games condition is
satis¯ed. The variable bh
t+1 denotes the number of units of the produced
good, in period t, that entitle the household to Rb
t+1bh
t+1 units of the
produced good in period t+1. Mt+1 i se n do fp e r i o dc u r r e n c yh e l df r o m
period t to t +1 . Et+1 is the electronic money. Currency and electronic
money are perfect substitutes. Ie
t+1 is the nominal rate of return on
these deposits. 1 ¡ ht is the labor supply and Pt is the price level. The
particular timing is the one in Svensson (1985), meaning that the agents
enter the period with money balances that are used for transactions that
same period.
Since currency does not pay nominal interest, a competitive equi-
librium where both currency and electronic money circulate must have
Ie








t+1, t ¸ 0( 4 )














¡1, t ¸ 0( 7 )
If Ie
t < 1, only currency circulates and (5) - (7) must hold. If instead
Ie








t+1;t¸ 0( 8 )
6meaning that the cost of holding money is only the di®erence between
t h er e t u r no nb o n d sa n dt h er e t u r no nm o n e yt h a ti nt h i sc a s ei sn o t
zero.
Financial intermediaries The ¯nancial intermediaries hold govern-
ment bonds, Ptbe
t+1, and issue interest bearing deposits that can be used
for purchases, Et+1, through the use of electronic debit cards. There is an
intermediation cost measured in units of labor, ne
t. We assume that the
¯nancial intermediaries operate a Leontie®-¯xed coe±cients technology
that produces electronic money and uses as inputs bonds and labor. The










The cash °ow of the ¯nancial intermediaries, in period t,i s
CF
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t, t ¸ 0( 9 )





t+1 = µ, t ¸ 0( 1 0 )
Government The government issues money, Ms
t+1, and real debt, dt+1,
to ¯nance government expenditures, gt. Government expenditures are a
credit good. We abstract from alternative sources of tax revenues so that
the government budget constraints are
M
s




tdt + Ptgt, t ¸ 0( 1 1 )


















where qt = 1
Rb
1:::Rb
t, t ¸ 1, q0 =1 .





t + gt =1¡ ht ¡ µ
Et
Pt





t , t ¸ 0( 1 4 )
Mt = M
s
t , t ¸ 0( 1 5 )





In this equilibrium the real values of currency and electronic money
are indeterminate. Therefore the level of government expenditures is also
indeterminate. For the utility function that is linear in leisure, consump-
tion is determinate but leisure is not. To abstract from this indeterminacy
we assume that when the cost of holding the two types of money is equal,
the households opt for currency.
If Ie
t > 1, only electronic money circulates. The price level and
the nominal interest rates are indeterminate. The real variables are not
a®ected by the multiplicity in the price levels and the nominal interest
rates.
In these economies with private issuers of electronic money, the
nominal interest rates are not driven down to zero. The reason is that
private issuance of electronic money is compatible with interest payments
on money, whereas that literature tended to exclude this possibility. Free
entry into this market drives the spread between the rate on bonds and
t h er a t eo ne l e c t r o n i cm o n e yd o w nt ot h ec o s to fs u p p l y i n gt h em o n e t a r y
substitutes. Competition between electronic money and currency can
itself drive down the interest rates, as will be shown in the next section.
3 Equilibria with commitment
In this section we consider full commitment optimal policies under the
assumption that the government maximizes revenue. Thus, we assume





where, for standard reasons, the function G i sa s s u m e dt ob ei n c r e a s i n g
and concave. The government maximizes this function subject to the
budget constraint and subject to the competitive equilibrium conditions
by choice of fMs
t , dt, gtg
1
t=0:
First, note from equation (7) that the equilibrium real rate of in-
terest is constant5. Using this result together with (4), (5) and (6) to



















where F is real demand for currency. If the government chooses Ib
t+1 ·
1+µ, so that only currency circulates, then F = M,w h e r eM is the




t+1,s ot h a t
c1
t+1 = mt+1 = M(Ib
t+1). If instead Ib
t+1 > 1+µ,t h e nF(Ib
t+1)=0 .T h e
government maximizes revenues by setting the monetary policy so that
M0
P0 =0 .
Given that G is assumed to be strictly concave and that the dis-
count factor of the government is equal to the real interest rate, the
government's problem can be simpli¯ed as the choice of a sequence of
nominal interest rates that maximizes








t+1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)R
b
0d0 (17)
If in the objective function we replace the function F for M so that
there are no constraints on the choice of the nominal interest rates arising
5This results from the linear structure of the utility function. Note that this
assumption rules out the time inconsistency problem discussed in Lucas and Stokey
(1983).
9from competition with electronic money, the solution is stationary and
corresponds to the maximum of the La®er curve, Ib⁄.F o rt h ei s o e l a s t i c
utility function, u(c)=c1¡￿
1¡￿ ,w i t h¾<1, as Ib
t+1 becomes arbitrarily
large, the revenue (Ib
t+1 ¡ 1)M(Ib
t+1)t e n d st oz e r o .A l s ow h e nIb
t+1 =1 ,
the revenue is zero. The maximum of the La®er curve corresponds to a
positive, ¯nite value for the interest rate. We assume that the preferences
speci¯cation is such that the value Ib⁄ is higher than 1 + µ. This means
that the revenue maximizer government would not choose an interest rate
lower than that value. Should the government choose Ib
t+1 > 1+µ?I nt h i s
case the revenue is zero. So the government will choose Ib
t+1 =1 + µ,f o ra l l
t ¸ 0, and raise µF(1+µ)of seigniorage revenue, per period. Since from
the zero pro¯t condition for the ¯nancial intermediaries Ib
t+1 = Ie
t+1 + µ,
it must be that Ie
t+1 = 1. We have shown that the following proposition
holds:
Proposition 1 Assume Ib⁄ ¸ 1+µ,w h e r eIb⁄ maximizes (Ib¡1)M(Ib).
Then the commitment solution for the revenue maximizing government
is Ib
t+1 =1+µ,a n dIe
t+1 =1 , for all t ¸ 0.
Electronic money drives the nominal interest rates to levels that
only account for the intermediation cost, i.e. the cost of providing the
alternative means of transactions to the households. In an environment
without electronic money, the government would set the monetary policy
so that the maximum revenue may be obtained. This would mean that
the interest rate would be Ib⁄, and the revenues would be g = ¯(Ib⁄ ¡
1)F(Ib⁄) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)Rb
0d0. Since government revenues are assumed to be
w o r t h l e s s ,t h ep r e s e n c eo fe l e c t r o n i cm o n e yi sw e l f a r ei m p r o v i n g .
Would the same result be obtained if regulation prevented the banks
from paying interest on electronic-money? Apparently yes, since the
resulting equilibrium is precisely zero interest on electronic-money. In
fact no, since it is assumed, that for equal prices the private agents opt
for the government currency. If banks could not pay a higher return
on electronic-money than on currency, then the central bank is free to
charge any price on currency.
10The optimal commitment solution is time inconsistent. In this so-
lution, at time zero, the government decides to hold real bonds issued by
the private sector that are exchanged for money and the gross nominal
interest rate is constant over time and set at 1+µ.A tt i m et, if the gov-























where gt are the government expenditures from period t on. The optimal
policy is to set the price level at time t arbitrarily large. This way
the government reduces the real value of the nominal liabilities. So the
interest rate plan for Ib
t = Pt
ﬂPt¡1 =1+µ would not be optimal, for a
government that could decide sequentially.
The discussion above suggests that lack of commitment can dras-
tically change the nature of currency competition. In fact, the govern-
mental agency that issues currency competes with the private issuers of
money by announcing an interest rate. However, as was shown above, the
equilibrium nominal interest rates, under commitment, are not time con-
sistent and therefore those announcements make no sense. As a result,
one could be led to think that an equilibrium with electronic money-only
would be the sole sequential equilibrium outcome. In fact this is not the
case. The credible threat of reversion to an equilibrium where currency
does not circulate might be enough to sustain the equilibrium solution
under commitment that was just described.
This means that currency competition when there is at least one
big player, that can in°uence the price level, is of a very di®erent nature
from competition under commitment. In Section 4; we determine the
sequential equilibria in an environment where the government precisely
cannot commit to the announced policy.
114 Equilibria without commitment
As it is clear from the discussion in the last section, the government
policies are not time consistent. Thus, in this section we consider repu-
tational equilibria where the competitive households and ¯nancial inter-
mediaries condition their decisions on the contemporaneous histories of
government policies. This framework naturally drives the analysis to the
interactions between competition and reputation.
Once we allow expectations of the agents to depend on histories,
there is always an equilibrium where only electronic money circulates.
This equilibrium is time consistent. The households expect that the
return on electronic money is higher than the one on currency, Ib
s+1 > 1+
µ, s ¸ t, and the real value of currency they decide to hold is equal to zero.
Given this the demand for real balances is zero and any monetary policy
is optimal. In particular, having a monetary policy of high interest rates,
consistent with agents' expectations, is a best reply for the government.
Since F(Ib
s+1)=0 ,s ¸ t,a n dMt




t = ¡(1 ¡ ¯)R
b
tdt
where WSE stands for worst sequential equilibrium. We do show now
that this is indeed the worst.
Note that a feasible policy for the government, at any time is to
follow a constant money rule. Under these conditions there are two sta-
tionary equilibria, one where prices are ¯nite and constant, and another
one where the real balances are zero. There may also be other equilibria
where the price level grows without bound. In any of these equilibria,
either F(I)i sz e r oo ri ti sp o s i t i v ea n dIt ¸ 1. The value for the govern-
ment is given by (17). Every term in the summation on the right hand
side is either positive or zero. In this case, independently of what the
private agents' optimal response is, the government can achieve, at least
the value V WSE
t : I nt h el a n g u a g eo fg a m et h e o r y ,t h i si st h er e s e r v a t i o n
value (minimax strategy) for the government. Therefore, there cannot
be a sequential equilibrium with a value lower than V WSE
t .
12The above argument shows that a monetary policy where, following
an arbitrary increase of the price level (say, to in¯nity), interest rates are
high enough, consistent with private sector's beliefs, and cash is not held,
is a Nash equilibrium. To de¯ne a policy, resulting in a sub-game per-
fect (and sequential) equilibrium, we must de¯ne how the government
will behave in the {zero probability{ event that some agents demand
cash anyway. In such case, we postulate that the revenue maximizing
government will set the price arbitrarily large (defaulting, again, on out-
standing liabilities) and setting interest rates, after that, as to have cash
(asset) return dominated by electronic money. Notice that in such a
{zero probability{ path, interest rates become arbitrarily large too.
In the tradition of Barro and Gordon (1983) and in line with Chari
and Kehoe(1990), Stokey (1991), Ireland (1994) and Chang (1996), we
apply Abreu (1988)'s optimal penal codes and use the reversion to the
worst sequential equilibrium as the means of supporting equilibrium out-
comes. The value of the worst sequential equilibrium outcome is com-













where Ib =1+µ.T h e RME equilibrium path can be supported as a
sequential equilibrium when its value is higher then the one of the WSE.
This is true when
¼ ¸ 0
meaning that the government has to get a positive gain from issuing
money. The proposition follows:
Proposition 2 The optimal policy under commitment is a sequential
equilibrium path if the intermediation cost, µ, is large enough that the
equilibrium in°ation rate is non-negative.
Proof. It was shown above that the optimal policy under commitment
is a sequential equilibrium whenever ¼ ¸ 0. This means that Ib ¸ ¯¡1.
But Ib =1 +µ. So it is necessary that µ ¸ ¯¡1 ¡ 1
13This result is not surprising if you think of seigniorage revenue
accounting. The total seigniorage revenue can be split in two parts: the
gains from lending out the real quantity of money (at the real interest
rate) plus the gains from issuing new money (the in°ation rate). If the
government defaults, the outstanding balances are valueless and there are
no future seigniorage revenues. If instead, there is no default, then the
gains are just the ones from future issuance of money. As long as these
are positive, meaning that the in°ation rate is positive, it is optimal for
the central bank to stay in business.
In a world without electronic money, the commitment solution
would be to set the nominal interest rate so that the maximum of the
La®er curve is obtained. As long as this value is positive, the equilib-
rium is sequential. In this case, the punishment is autarchy, but from
the perspective of a revenue maximizing government, this has the same
value as the electronic money-only equilibrium.
One could think that competition with electronic money would
drive the nominal interest rates to values that could not be sustained,
because the opportunity cost of defaulting would be substantially re-
duced. This is partially true. Competition with electronic money drives
the in°ation tax to a low level under commitment, but this solution is a
sequential equilibrium provided the intermediation cost is big enough, to
guarantee the bene¯ts from the future issuing of currency.
If the commitment solution is not a sequential equilibrium then
the only sequential equilibrium path is the equilibrium without currency.
However since currency is replaced by electronic money this "autarchic"
solution may not be such a great disaster. In the way we have modelled
money, there is a liquidity e®ect so that the switch to electronic money
implies the destruction of the real value of liquid assets and so the cash
good is not consumed in that period. However from the following pe-
riod on the households would be using electronic money as the means of
exchange, supporting the cost of intermediation.
We have seen that the requirement for the commitment solution
to be sequential is that the intermediation costs are not too low. One
way of guaranteeing that these costs are big enough is to establish re-
14serve requirements. That way competition with electronic money is made
softer and so the revenues from issuing money may be increased to the
point that the revenue maximizing government is not interested in de-
faulting. In the next section we analyze the e®ects of considering reserve
requirements, for the equilibria with and without commitment.
5 Reserve requirements
Reserve requirements can be understood as a technological constraint
or instead as a legal requirement. We assume that, as it is in most
cases, legal requirements on idle reserves are a fraction of total deposits.
Therefore every bank faces a ¯xed coe±cients technology with deposits,
labor input and reserves, such that







where Zt+1 are reserves and z is the linear reserve requirement. In period
t, the cash °ow of the ¯nancial intermediaries is
CF
e
t = Et+1 ¡ Ptb
e






t + Zt ¡ µEt, t ¸ 0( 1 9 )





t+1 = µ + z(I
b
t+1 ¡ 1), t ¸ 0( 2 0 )
The government budget constraint is not a®ected by the presence of
the reserve requirements, but the government money supply must now,
in equilibrium, be equal to the demand by the households and by the
¯nancial intermediaries.
Mt + Zt = M
s
t , t ¸ 0( 2 1 )
15The competitive equilibrium where both currency and electronic money




























where F is the real demand for currency and reserves. If the government
chooses Ib
t+1 · 1+ ￿
1¡z, so that only currency circulates, then again
F = M,w h e r eM is the function mt+1 = M(Ib




t+1.I f i n s t e a d Ib
t+1 > 1+ ￿




t+1)=zM(1 + µ + z(I
b
t+1 ¡ 1)):
Note ¯rst that reserve requirements do not change the nature of the
problem concerning the period zero balances. Therefore, the government
maximizes revenues by setting the monetary policy so that M0
P0 = Z0
P0 =0
. The government's problem can be simpli¯ed as the choice of a sequence
of nominal interest rates that maximizes








t+1) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)R
b
0d0 (24)
If the reserve requirement, z, is taken to be exogenous, there are
three types of solutions. First, if the intermediation cost, µ,i sv e r yl o w ,
eventually zero, then, for currency to circulate, the nominal interest rate
must be very low. Therefore, the government cannot get almost any
seigniorage revenue from currency. In this case, the solution is to set
a nominal interest rate such that only electronic money circulates, and
that maximizes the seigniorage imposed on reserve requirements, the
only demand for currency in the equilibrium. Therefore, the government
maximizes
z(I
b ¡ 1)M(1 + z(I
b ¡ 1)):
16This means that the choice of the nominal interest rate is Ib =
Ib⁄¡(1¡z)
z
where Ib⁄ is the interest rate that maximizes the La®er curve, de¯ned as
(Ib ¡ 1)M(Ib).
A second possible solution can occur for intermediate values of µ
and z: This is a case in which the maximum of the La®er curve is to the
right of 1 + ￿
1¡z: Thus, electronic money does impose an upper bound
on the nominal interest rate. However, the government is better o® by
imposing a low{ relative to the maximum of the La®er curve {interest
rate but having a larger tax base, rather than imposing a higher interest
rate but collecting the tax on a fraction of the money in circulation. In
this case, the solution is the corner Ib =1+ ￿
1¡z. Here only currency
circulates, as well.
Finally, if µ and z are high enough, it might be that Ib⁄ < 1+ ￿
1¡z,
in which case Ib⁄ will be the solution, and only currency circulates. The
value of this solution is g = ¯(Ib⁄¡1)M(Ib⁄)¡(1¡¯)Rb
0d0.I nt h i sc a s e ,
the intermediation costs combined with the reserve requirements imply
that electronic money cannot compete with currency.
If the same agency that picks the in°ation tax also determines the






In this case the government gets the revenue corresponding to the maxi-
mum of the La®er curve and only currency circulates6.
The presence of reserve requirements, by forcing the banks to hold
non-interest bearing assets, has the e®ect of softening the competition
with electronic money. In the extreme case of a 100% reserve require-
ment, electronic money competition is killed.
Note that with reserve requirements, the condition for currency to
dominate electronic money becomes
6If the intermediation cost was zero then this solution could be reproduced by





Therefore, from the viewpoint of the government, an economy with inter-
mediation costs equal to µ and reserve requirements equal to z is equiva-






The solution with an endogenous reserve requirement corresponds to the
maximum of the La®er curve so it is equivalent to the solution without
electronic money. In that case the non-committed government is able to
sustain a high level of the in°ation tax.
For any exogenous level of the reserve requirement, if the commit-
ment equilibrium is such that only currency circulates, then the punish-
ment is to revert to electronic money but with arbitrarily large nominal
interest rates so that the solution is autarchy. So for the revenue maxi-
mizing government the e®ect of the reserve requirements is to raise the
value of the equilibria under commitment, improving the conditions for
sustainability of the equilibria. This result is summarized in the following
proposition:
Proposition 3 Whenever µ<¯ ¡1 ¡ 1, it is possible to sustain an
equilibrium solution under commitment if the reserve requirements are
high enough, as long as the in°ation rate that maximizes the La®er curve
is non-negative.
Proof. Let the reserve requirement z be such that 1 + ￿
1¡z = ¯¡1.I f
the in°ation rate that maximizes the La®er curve is non-negative, the
equilibrium under commitment for the interest rate must be Ib ¸ ¯¡1,
since the government can at least get the revenues from the currency-only
equilibrium with Ib = ¯¡1. As we showed in the previous proposition,
the currency-only equilibrium is sequential as long as the equilibrium
18in°ation rate is non-negative, i.e Ib ¸ ¯¡1.S i n c et h ec a s ew h e r eIb >¯ ¡1
must correspond to higher revenues, the equilibrium under commitment
is sustainable
5.0.1 Reserve requirements as a policy tool
Reserve requirements can act as a means of guaranteeing the sustainabil-
ity of the commitment solution for the revenue maximizing government.
If the commitment solution is not sustainable the solution will be the
autarchic equilibrium that is a sequential equilibrium. In terms of wel-
fare in this case with reserve requirements the punishment is very severe,
since the households can reduce the revenues to the government only
by driving electronic money out of circulation. The households would
be better o® paying the in°ation tax that brings the highest revenue to
the government. The endogeneity of the reserve requirement, softens the
asymmetry of the punishment to the households and to the government
since it would be an o®-equilibrium outcome.
An obvious policy recommendation is the careful and independent
use of the reserve requirement instrument as a means of obtaining sus-
tainability of the revenue maximizing, commitment solution.
6 The case of a \representative" govern-
ment
In this section we brie°y show how the results change when we assume
that the government maximizes the utility function of the consumers.
The standard Ramsey problem assumes ¯xed government expenditures.
As the ability to collect seigniorage will be limited by the e±ciency of the
¯nancial intermediaries, we allow the government to levy consumption
taxes, ¿t, to ensure that expenditures can be ¯nanced. As we will see,
a \representative" government with full commitment, will obey optimal
taxation principles and implement the Friedman principle of zero nominal
interest rates after the initial period. It also may want to tax relatively
19more the ¯rst period cash good by increasing the initial price level (as we
will see, whether or not the government wants to do this, depends on the
price elasticity of the consumption good). This is the basis of the time
inconsistency of the optimal monetary policy. Before analyzing policies
without full commitment, we must characterize equilibria with electronic
money and the Ramsey {full commitment{ solution.
The consumer's problem is as before, except for the presence of a










We simplify the analysis of this section by assuming Constant Relative
Risk Aversion (CRRA). That is, ¡
u00(ct)ct
u0(ct) = ¾,w h e r e1 =¾ is the price
elasticity of ct. For simplicity we also assume that ¾ · 1. The budget

















t · Mt + Et (26)

































t+1 =( 1+µ) t ¸ 0( 3 0 )
where the last equality follows from the zero pro¯t condition in ¯nancial
intermediation.
206.1 Optimal policy under commitment
The solution under commitment is a Ramsey (1927) optimal taxation
problem, in the line developed by Lucas and Stokey (1983) and Chari,
Christiano and Kehoe (1993); as them, we follow the {so called{ primal
approach. The objective of the government is to maximize the welfare
of the representative household, subject to feasibility and competitive
equilibrium constraints; in the primal approach, these competitive equi-
librium constraints are consolidated in a unique implementability con-
straint.
More precisely, consider ¯rst the case where Ie
t+1 · 1, which means
that only currency circulates. In order to eliminate prices, we substitute
(27), (28), (29) and (26) into (25) (pre-multiplied by ¸t¯¡t), and obtain
















¡1 =0 ( 3 1 )
Now, if we add the discounted restrictions (31), imposing appropriate





















t ¡®(1¡ht)] = 0
(32)
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t + g ¡ (1 ¡ ht) · 0( 3 3 )
Let ° ¸ 0 be the Lagrange multiplier associated with the imple-
mentability constraint (32). The following equations characterize the
Ramsey equilibrium, and show the time inconsistency problem when the











=1 t ¸ 0( 3 4 )













t ¸ 0( 3 6 )
It follows that the solution of the Ramsey policy is the Friedman rule
and the corresponding equilibrium is stationary from period one on. In
the context of optimal taxation rules, the Friedman rule means that the
two goods, cash and credit, are taxed at the same rate. This is the
optimal solution since the utility function is homothetic in the two goods
and separable in leisure. These are the conditions for uniform taxation
of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1972), as pointed out by Lucas and Stokey
(1983) and Chari, Christiano and Kehoe (1993). Furthermore, if the
price elasticity is greater than one (¾<1 ) ,t h ec o n s u m p t i o ni np e r i o d0
of the cash good is lower than the consumption from period 1 on. That
is, there is a higher tax on the initial cash good (with a price elasticity
of one). In summary,
Proposition 4 Assume CRRA. In a Ramsey equilibrium, Ib
t+1 =1and





This solution is an equilibrium even if electronic money is a liq-
uid asset since the zero pro¯t condition implies that Ie
t+1 = Ib
t+1 ¡ µ,
t ¸ 0, and, since µ>0, the currency printed by the government domi-
nates in rate of return electronic money when the government implements
the Ramsey policy; in particular, the nominal interest rate on electronic
money is negative. The last argument also shows that there can not be
a Ramsey equilibrium in which households only use electronic money (if
private ¯nancial intermediation is more costly than central bank inter-
mediation) as stated in the following corollary
Corollary 5 When µ>0, the Ramsey solution is such that Ie
t+1 · 1,
t ¸ 0, so that electronic money does not circulate.
Suppose that there was an equilibrium with Ie





1+µ; for t ¸ 0. However, this relation between cash and credit goods
22could have been achieved by the \representative government" (in the
previous case of Ie
t+1 · 1), by setting Ib
t+1 =1+µ,i nw h i c hc a s et h e
government would have collected seignorage revenues. As we have seen,
with constant elasticity, the government chooses not to impose such a
distortion and has less incentive to do so when there are no revenues, as
it is the case when agents only use electronic money.
With full commitment, the \representative government" can cred-
ibly guarantee that Ie
t = Ib
t ¡ µ · 1 and, therefore, he always chooses to
exercise this option. That is, with full commitment the analysis of the
Ramsey problem reduces to the case, analyzed above, of Ie
t+1 · 1.
6.2 Optimal policy without commitment
As we have seen, if ¾<1, the Ramsey solution is time inconsistent,
meaning that money is printed at a rate higher than the one consistent
with Friedman rule. Nevertheless, if deviating from such path is costly
enough for the \representative" government, then it may be a sequential
equilibrium path; that is, it may be a credible policy. We now study
under which conditions the Friedman rule is credible.
Proceeding as we have done in Section 4, with the revenue maxi-
mizing government, we characterize {for the representative government{
the worst sequential equilibrium that can follow a deviation and compare
this path with the Ramsey {Friedman rule{ path.
Suppose that the government has been following the Ramsey pol-
icy up to period t and that its current liabilities {in real terms{ are
consistent with the Ramsey policy being kept forever {say, dt. Suppose,
furthermore, that if in period t ¸ 1, the government deviates from the
Ramsey policy, by increasing the price level, the private sector reacts im-
mediately and currency is driven out of circulation since only electronic
money is demanded. This results in an arbitrarily large price level. This
also means that the real value of the outstanding electronic money is also
made arbitrarily low. As a result the households are unable to consume
the cash good, in that period. Notice that when the private sector only
23demands electronic money, to set an arbitrarily large price is a best re-
sponse for the government, as it is for individual private agents not to
demand cash after a currency collapse (i.e., the deviation path is Nash
and {in the language of Chari and Kehoe{ sustainable). Furthermore, if
the government policy states that in the event that some private agents
demand cash, then it will set prices according to the myopic (period
zero) policy (and not according the Friedman rule), then the equilibrium
is sub-game perfect, hence {in this context{ sequential8.
To characterize the worst sequential equilibrium, let V W
t be the
value, to the representative government, of the path following a deviation
in period t. Since there is no consumption of the cash good (i.e., there
is a currency crunch), we have that
V
W





w h e r et h ef o l l o w i n gp e r i o dv a l u e ,WW(¿W) takes the form
W
W(¿)=[ u(c(¿)) + u(c￿(¿)) + ®h￿(¿)]=(1 ¡ ¯):
G i v e nat a xr a t e¿, consumptions and labor supplies satisfy:
u
0(c(¿)) = ®(1 + ¿)( 3 7 )
u
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¡1 (38)








8See Benhabib et al.(1997) for a similar characterization of credible policies (notice,
however, that our equilibrium is not perfect in the Benhabib et al. sense).
24where,
W
R(¿)=[ 2 u(c(¿)) + ®h(¿)]=(1 ¡ ¯)
and, given a tax rate ¿, consumptions and labor supplies must satisfy
(37) and
h(¿)=1¡ (2c(¿)+g)
Finally, in order to compute the \Ramsey tax" ¿R we need to know
the consumption of the cash good and labor supply in period zero:



















Notice that one can account for the possible interest of the \repre-
sentative government" in deviating in period t by comparing the resulting
budgets in that period. As we have just seen, the budget corresponding





D) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)dt¯
¡1
while the present value budget of following the Ramsey path is
g =2 ¿
Rc(¿
R) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)(1 + ¿
R)c(¿
R) ¡ (1 ¡ ¯)dt¯
¡1 (40)
There are three di®erences between (38) and (40). The ¯rst is that
c￿(¿D)s h o w su pi n s t e a do fc(¿R): This re°ects the fact that after a de-
viation, consumers use electronic money to buy the cash good, which is
dominated by currency at the Ramsey equilibrium. Therefore, consump-
tion of the cash good following a deviation is lower than at the Ramsey
25solution. Note that this means that as the tax base will be lower, the tax
rate must be higher, everything else constant. The second is that since,
after a deviation, there is a {one period{ liquidity crunch,t h eg o v e r n -
m e n tc a n n o tc o l l e c tc o n s u m p t i o nt a x e sf r o mt h ec a s hg o o di nt h ep e r i o d
t. Thus, the value of the tax revenues is discounted by ¯: This also means
that the tax base is lower, such that everything else constant, the tax
must be higher. Finally, the third di®erence is that the second term in
the right-hand-side of (40) is not present in (38). This is precisely the
bene¯t of the deviation, the destruction of the real value of outstanding
currency. In this case, everything else constant, the after deviation tax
must be lower. Note that if the two ¯rst e®ects dominate, the tax after a
deviation is higher than the Ramsey tax, so a deviation lowers the utility
of the government, which means that the Ramsey allocation is sustain-
able. An example is when ¯ is made arbitrarily close to one. Then, it
must be that ¿R · ¿D, with equality when µ is made arbitrarily close to
zero. In the case of equality, the value of the deviation is lower than the
value of the Ramsey solution because of the liquidity crunch.
When the gains from the initial destruction of real liabilities are
enough to induce ¿R >¿ D, then this e®ect must be compared with the
costs of making the consumption of the cash good too low { the liquidity
crunch{, as well as the waste in resources from using electronic money
in transactions rather than using the more e±cient currency. If the costs
outweigh the bene¯ts, V R
t ¸ V RW
t , the Ramsey solution is a sequential
equilibrium path. In particular, the Friedman rule is sustainable if the
discount factor and the intermediation costs are not too low and the
liquidity crunch factor, from having u(0) instead of u(c(¿R), results in a
severe loss of utility.
R e s e r v er e q u i r e m e n t sh a v en oe ® e c to nt h eR a m s e ys o l u t i o n .T h i s
solution is the Friedman rule and electronic money does not circulate.
However, the presence of the reserve requirements can increase the pun-
ishment, to the disutility of autarchy, since this would be an equilibrium
with an arbitrarily large nominal interest rate. This would help sustain
the commitment solution.
In summary, when governments are benevolent, electronic money
26reduces the punishment of a deviation and therefore makes it harder to
sustain the optimal solution. However, the punishment might still be
severe enough, so that the Friedman rule can still be the outcome of a
sequential equilibrium.
7 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have seen how the role of electronic money competition
(and of similar \money substitutes") as a disciplinary mechanism is fairly
di®erent depending on: the relative e±ciency of ¯nancial intermediaries,
the preferences of the government and its ability to commit, and the
extent of reserve requirements restrictions.
T h ei n t r od u c t i o no fe l e c t r o n i cm o n e ya ® e c t st h er e t u r n so ft h ep r o ¯ t
maximizing government by competing away some of the monopolistic
rents and, as a result, lowering the equilibrium in°ation rates in the
full commitment equilibrium. When there is not full commitment, the
cost for a pro¯t maximizing government from deviating, by defaulting on
current cash balances (i.e., government liabilities), is simply the loss of
future seignorage rents. The presence of electronic money does not a®ect
the revenues of the government after a deviation, since the seignorage
revenues are zero independently of whether households can or can not
substitute currency for other liquid assets. However, with lower gains |
due to the presence of electronic money| the relative cost of a deviation
is also lower and, hence, higher the incentive to deviate. Nevertheless, if
¯nancial intermediation is costly enough, a pro¯t maximizer government
will not deviate from the full commitment path.
In contrast, with a \representative" government, the introduction
of electronic money does not a®ect the returns of the government since,
under full commitment, the Ramsey policy prescription is the Friedman
rule and electronic money is {asset return{ dominated by the govern-
ment currency. In our model, it follows from standard optimal taxation
principles that the Ramsey policy is time-inconsistent. The presence of
electronic money a®ects the value {to the government{ of the equilibrium
27path after a deviation. Since the government shares the preferences of
the household, and the household is better o® when it is able to consume
cash goods with electronic money than in autarchy (and, furthermore,
the tax base is wider), the \punishment" after a deviation is not so se-
vere. Therefore, the incentive to deviate from the Friedman rule is higher,
when there is electronic money. But, as we have seen, the liquidity crunch
e®ect may be enough of a deterrence to prevent the \representative" gov-
ernment to deviate from the Ramsey policy even when there is electronic
money.
In both cases, whether the government is \representative" or pro¯t
maximizer, if a deviation from the full commitment solution takes place
(because the deterrence e®ects are not strong enough), households are
better o® if electronic money is in existence (e.g., the relation between
cash and credit goods is less distorted). There is, however, a region of
parameters where deviations will take place with electronic money and
will not take place without its presence. Only in this region may a world
without electronic money be preferred by households.
Reserve requirements a®ect the competition between currency and
electronic money. With reserve requirements the rents in the full com-
mitment solution with a revenue maximizing government are higher, and
the costs of a deviation from the Friedman rule path with a welfare
maximizing government are also higher. So reserve requirements make
it easier to sustain the commitment solutions, which may result in a
welfare improvement, when the government is revenue maximizer. Sim-
ilarly, reserve requirements can make the deviation paths more harmful
to a \representative" government, in the presence of electronic money.
That is, our analysis also provides prescriptions for the use of reserve
requirements as policy instruments, even if our deterministic, perfect in-
formation, economies are absent of the problems that usually justify their
existence.
While this paper suggests many new inquires, there is one, in par-
ticular, that we are pursuing: the analysis of \currency competition" in
its strict sense. With this our analysis will be in closer line with the his-
torical debate on currency competition (see White, 1993) and will also
28provide more general insights on how competition and reputation {as
disciplinary mechanisms{ may interact in a given market structure.
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